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1. Introduction: Corporate income tax harmonization within the EU 
 
In 50 years the member states have failed to come to an agreement on the future of 
corporate taxation within the EU. As the political landscape is becoming ever more 
complicated, cooperation between a subgroup of countries is a potentially interesting 
option for the future. Therefore, this paper reviews the literature on corporate income tax 
harmonization from the perspective of the EU with a focus on the prospects for an 
enhanced cooperation agreement (ECA) between a subset of countries instead of all 27 
EU member states. 
Based on the literature I conclude that it is unlikely that enhanced cooperation on 
corporate taxation will result in substantial welfare improvements within the EU. Three 
arguments can be listed. First, cooperation agreements between all member states yield 
a small average welfare gain at maximum. Second, weaker forms of cooperation, 
including enhanced cooperation, yield even smaller welfare gains. Third, an ECA 
introduces new political dynamics into the EU political arena. It creates the possibility of 
self-selection into coalitions after which new vested interests are created without yielding 
substantial welfare gains for the EU as a whole. It seems wiser to first solve the arbitrage 
opportunities within countries before considering cross-country harmonization. 
Before discussing the literature leading to these conclusions let me first stress the 
relevance of the topic. The corporate income tax is an important source of revenue for 
the member states of the EU constituting between 5 and 15% of total tax revenues.1 
Competition between member states of order to attract profits and real investments is 
expected to erode corporate income tax revenues in the long run. This concern fueled 
the discussion on the need for corporate income tax harmonization in the EU from the 
1950s onwards. However, economists have never agreed.  
Already in the 1990s, the relevant arguments in the harmonization debate feature pre-
dominantly in the literature. First of all, corporate income tax systems differ widely within 
the EU.2 These differences in corporate income tax regimes distort investment and 
financing decisions by companies, leading to economic waste in terms of forgone 
profitable investments and resources spend on activities that are unproductive from a 
social point of view. Furthermore, competition between governments is expected to 
erode corporate tax revenues. Based on these concerns, some leading authors expect 
that tax harmonization is inevitable.3 4 On the other hand, the advantages of tax diversity 
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should not be underestimated; difference in corporate income taxes signal 
heterogeneous preferences for optimal tax levels across the EU.5 Furthermore, 
competition might be needed to discipline politicians.6 Finally, decentralized policy 
making provides opportunities for governments to learn from each other, an argument 
that is often ignored in the literature.7 In the 20 years that followed these publications, 
the arguments have not fundamentally changed. In contrast, our knowledge concerning 
the strength of the arguments has.8 9 
The literature on tax harmonization is vast and the present review is therefore not 
complete.10 However, the paper extends the existing literature with a discussion of 
enhanced cooperation in corporate income taxation. I will focus my discussion solely on 
the corporate income tax instruments. A large number of interesting topics are therefore 
excluded. For example, I do not touch upon the issue of spillovers in public goods, 
personal taxes on capital, labor mobility or consumption tax competition and I do not 
address the question whether capital income should be taxed at all. 
In the remainder of this paper, I will first briefly review the EU history on cooperation 
initiatives in corporate income taxation. Second, I explain why the classical tax 
competition model with all its extensions does not find an unambiguous welfare gain. 
Finally, I will discuss the option of enhanced cooperation within the EU. The final section 
concludes by combining these theoretical insights into a policy recommendation.  
 
2. A brief history of coordination initiatives within the EU 
 
Corporate income tax harmonization within the EU comes with a long history.11 The first 
milestones are the reports by Neumark in 1962, Segré in 1966 and van den Tempel in 
1970. All three reports concluded that, some degree of harmonization of the corporate 
income tax legislation is desirable. Neumark stressed the need to alleviate double 
taxation of the return on equity by introducing a split-rate system; Segré urged the 
removal of taxes that work against an integrated capital market; and van den Tempel 
concluded that the EU should adopt a classical corporate income tax system instead of 
an imputation system or split rate system for reasons of simplicity. In the aftermath of 
each of the reports the European Commission (EC) experienced that harmonization 
initiatives would be politically difficult due to the unanimity requirement for tax policy 
decisions and an expected outflow of profits towards tax havens. The 1975 Draft 
directive corporate income taxation by the EC reflects these concerns. The directive 
                                                 
5
 S. Cnossen, 1990, On the Direction of Tax Harmonization in the European Community. In H. Siebert (ed.), 
Reforming Capital Income Taxation in a Global Economy, New York: Elsevier. 
6
 P. Salin, 1990, Is there a Need for Harmonizing Capital Income Taxes within EC Countries? A Comment. 
In H. Siebert (ed.), Reforming Capital Income Taxation in a Global Economy, New York: Elsevier. 
7
 A. L. Bovenberg and V. Tanzi, 1990, Is There a Need for Harmonizing Capital Income Taxes within EC 
countries? In H. Siebert (ed.), Reforming Capital Income Taxation in a Global Economy, New York: Elsevier. 
8
 G. Nicodeme, 2006, Corporate Tax Competition and Coordination in the European Union: What do we 
know? Where do we stand? MPRA Working Paper, no 107. 
9
 R. Griffith, J. Hines and P. B. Sørensen, 2008, International capital taxation, Forthcoming in the Mirrlees 
Review: Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century, to be published by the Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
10
 Excellent review papers on the tax competition literature are: J. D. Wilson, 1999, Theories of Tax 
Competition, National Tax Journal, 52, 269-304, G. R. Zodrow, 2003, Tax Competition and Tax Coordination 
in the European Union, International Tax and Public Finance, 10, 651-671, J. D. Wilson and D. E. Wildasin, 
2004, Capital tax competition: bane or boon? Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1065-1091, and G. 
Nicodeme, 2006, Corporate Tax Competition and Coordination in the European Union: What do we know? 
Where do we stand? MPRA Working Paper, no 107. 
11
 A. Easson, 1992, Harmonization of Direct Taxation in the European Community: From Neumark to 
Ruding, Canadian Tax Journal, 40, 600-638. 
 3 
proposed an imputation system for the corporate income tax such that foreign capital 
owners are refunded. Furthermore, the report proposes a restricted range for statutory 
tax rates between 45-55 percent and a harmonized dividend withholding tax at 25 
percent. 
The more recent harmonization proposals start in 1992 with the Ruding committee. This 
committee concluded that community action is necessary given large economic 
distortions due to differences in corporate income tax systems in the EU. However, 
national sovereignty should be taken into account at least until the EMU is completely 
finished.12 The committee proposed a number of policy directions. It proposed a lower 
bound on the corporate income taxes around 30% and maximum around 40%. 
Furthermore, tax base harmonization should be achieved and harmful tax practices, like 
discriminating withholding taxes, should be abandoned.  
Only the final recommendation has been implemented in the EU as of 2010 with the 
agreement by the EU member states on a Code of Conduct on business taxation in 
1998. The code stipulates that countries should not discriminate between industries in 
their tax laws. Specifically, they agreed not to discriminate between residents and non-
residents; not to grant tax advantages to firms without substantial real economic activity 
within the borders of the country; not to depart from international standards in the 
definition of profit; and to apply transparent administrative procedures in enforcing 
taxation.13 A total of 66 “harmful” tax measures are identified and should be removed 
before 2008. 
The Bolkenstein report in 200114 constitutes the present view on corporate tax 
harmonization by the EC. In general, the report calls for a uniform set of rules regarding 
the definition of corporate taxable income across countries and postpones the initiatives 
on rate harmonization. Substantial welfare gains are expected from the former, while the 
latter is deemed unachievable in the medium term. The proposal of a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) originates from this report and will be 
discussed later. Several subsequent reports have studied the proposals for base 
harmonization. Important is the conclusion from the 2004 report Economic effects of tax 
cooperation in an enlarged European Union15 which suggests that a full cooperation 
between all member states is unlikely to materialize; enhanced cooperation between a 
subset of countries is the most likely route towards tax cooperation. 
The above survey highlights the political struggles on this topic since the 1960s. 
Harmonization initiatives have become less ambitious over time and are negotiated 
amongst an increasing number of member states (6 in 1960, 27 presently). These 
political struggles signal a number of fundamental underlying dynamics that are 
unfavorable for future policy coordination. An enhanced cooperation agreement, 
discussed in Section 4, might be the only way out. Section 3 will first discuss the 
economic theory behind tax harmonization. 
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3. Full cooperation between all countries unfeasible 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Ever since tax competition has been formalized in economic models has the study of tax 
harmonization been part of formal economic analyses, a conclusion has not been 
reached though. This confusion in the theoretical literature signals the inability to 
cooperate by politicians. Therefore, it is important to understand the forces at work. 
 
3.2. Full cooperation in the classical tax competition models 
For a tax coordination agreement between countries to be unambiguously welfare 
improving a number of restrictive assumptions need to be imposed. First of all, a 
common gain (surplus) from cooperation must exist. In tax competition models, 
governments deciding on their tax rates unilaterally, choose rates that are to low from a 
global welfare perspective due to the existence of tax spillovers. Individual governments 
do not take these spillovers into account when making their individual policy decisions.16 
By cooperating, tax spillovers will be internalized into the policy decisions and global 
welfare is increased: the surplus from cooperation. Related to corporate income taxation, 
the cross-country mobility of the tax base (profits and capital) facilitates the spillover: a 
higher tax burden in one country expands the tax base in other countries, implying a 
positive tax spillover. Second, countries must be symmetric in all respects. Symmetry 
implies both that the spillovers are equally large for all countries involved and it ensures 
that the inhabitants of these countries have identical objectives: tastes are aligned. 
Third, governments must be benevolent and have no commitment problems. The 
government acts in the interest of its citizens and will not fool them either now or in the 
future. Under these assumptions, the citizens of all countries gain equally from a 
cooperation agreement, a grand coalition of all countries can be established without 
problems. The classical papers obey the above assumptions.17 
 
3.3. Full cooperation in an extended model 
In the remainder of this section, I present arguments to illustrate that cooperation need 
not be welfare improving for all countries involved when the assumptions listed above 
are generalized. 
Let me start with two arguments that suppress the common gain from cooperation. First, 
ceteris paribus, an endogenous savings decision by individuals results in an aggregate 
cross country tax base that is elastic in the average tax burden.18 19 When cooperation 
results in higher taxes, savings and investment will be reduced such that a ceiling on tax 
revenues exists. Second, cross-ownership of shares by investors causes a negative tax 
spillover: governments have an incentive to impose higher taxes to export part of their 
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tax burden abroad. This negative tax spillover counter-acts the positive tax spillover in 
the classical tax competition model: unilateral tax policies are less inefficient.20 
On the other hand, new benefits from cooperation arise if the model is extended with 
heterogeneous citizens and a government, controlled by the median voter, that 
redistributes income towards the poor using distortionary taxes on labor and 
internationally mobile capital. Tax coordination reduces the excess burden on the use of 
these taxes and results in more redistribution.21 
Asymmetries between countries lead to disagreement on the optimal common policy: 
each country has an unique optimal tax policy. For example, differences in the 
preference for public policy (including redistribution) implies that countries unilaterally 
prefer different tax levels. These differences in cross-country tax levels result in an 
inefficient allocation of resources across countries. In this case, harmonization of rates 
does not only yield a common gain in terms of increased economic efficiency or more 
public goods; it also imposes an undesirable uniformity upon the parties that join the 
cooperative agreement. The net common gain from cooperation is ambiguous as a 
result.22 
In general, asymmetries in endowments between countries create both a potential gain 
from cooperation, in terms of economic efficiency, and vested interests that are hard to 
overcome. For example, differences in population size introduces an asymmetry in the 
relative size of the tax spillover. The tax spillover is relatively small for large countries 
and large for small countries. Unilateral optimal tax rates are therefore lower in small 
countries compared to large countries. Welfare is the highest in the small countries due 
to a massive, relative to its size, inflow of capital. From a global perspective, the tax 
differential creates an inefficient over-investment in the smaller country. Harmonization 
overcomes this inefficiency and allows for a first-best public good supply. But very small 
countries might lose from tax cooperation agreements as harmonization is followed by a 
massive outflow of capital. The asymmetry has the potential to create a vested interest 
that breaks down the negotiation or requires the use of side payments to convince the 
unwilling party.23 
Similarly, vested interests are created through differences in capital endowments 
resulting in asymmetric capital positions: “rich” countries will invest in the “poor” 
countries until marginal products are equalized. Capital importing “poor” countries have 
an incentive to export part of their tax bill towards foreign capital owners by manipulating 
their terms of trade, the interest rate, by imposing a high tax.24 Related are differences 
caused by agglomeration rents. A country that possesses agglomeration rents will 
charge a relative high tax rate as these rents can be taxed at low economic cost: public 
goods provision is relatively cheap. On the other hand, a country without agglomeration 
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rents will charge a relative low rate to attract some economic activity from the “core” 
country. In the end, both countries might gain from tax competition due to this 
asymmetry in endowments, such that both are unwilling to cooperate.25  
Finally, gains from cooperation are unsure in case of government failure. For example, 
when the government does not exclusively care about the interest of its citizens, but 
cares about its own, rent-seeking by a Leviathan government,26 some degree of tax 
competition is desirable to “tame the Leviathan.”27 Without the disciplining force of tax 
base flight the government can freely extract resources from the citizens for its own 
benefit. From a related argument, tax competition might help the government in solving a 
commitment problem regarding the future taxation of investments and savings.28 This 
argument follows when assuming that it is difficult to relocate investments in response to 
tax changes. Governments have an incentive to set low taxes first and raise them after 
the investment is made. Expecting this, citizens will under-invest if the government 
cannot convince them that it will not raise the taxes. The fear of capital flight prevents 
the increase in tax rates in the future and provides therefore an effective commitment 
mechanism for the government. Tax coordination removes this disciplining mechanism 
and might lead to welfare losses. Finally, government failure is expected to be more 
likely the larger the distance to the voter (leading to a loss of information on 
preferences). Higher levels of government are therefore more likely to impose inefficient 
policies.29 
 
3.4. Current EU policy: constraining competition between all countries 
The above studies focus on a full harmonization of tax policy. But, following the recent 
publications by the EC, such a full harmonization of all components of the corporate 
income tax in all EU member states is unlikely in the short run. Instead the EC tries to 
constrain competition between members by eliminating harmful tax practices and 
introducing a harmonized corporate income tax base. Around both issues a theoretical 
literature has evolved. Eggert and Haufler present an excellent overview.30 I will 
summarize the main lessons.  
With respect to constraining harmful tax practices, it remains to be questioned whether it 
is wise to do so from an efficiency argument. The basic insight is that from a second-
best argument, restricting the freedom of agents need not imply a welfare 
improvement.31 Ramsey-principles imply that an efficient tax system levies higher tax 
rates on immobile tax bases compared to the more mobile tax bases. Once this is 
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prohibited, the (non-cooperative) tax system becomes less efficient by definition.32 
However, when the aggregate cross-country tax base is elastic a restriction on the use 
of tax instruments might raise revenues when the restriction expands the aggregate tax 
base for the countries involved.33  
With respect to a complete cross-country harmonization of the rules determining taxable 
income, the CCCTB, two steps can be identified. First, a common definition of taxable 
income must be decided upon. Most likely, this will imply a broadening of the domestic 
tax base for some countries, and vice-versa. To determine the change in welfare, the 
optimal response by the government in the remaining tax instruments is crucial. 
Generally, the statutory tax rate and the definition of taxable income within a country are 
substitutes for raising revenue: a country that broadens its tax base will therefore most 
likely lower its statutory rate.34 Or more popular: competition is intensified on the 
remaining instruments which suppresses the welfare gains from cooperation. 
Second, implementing the CCCTB requires replacing separate accounting with formula 
apportionment. From the literature is not clear whether replacing separate accounting 
with formula apportionment is welfare enhancing.35 In case of SA, accounts terminate at 
the border and multinationals use transfer pricing and financial policies to minimize their 
EU (world) wide tax bill. Besides this, investment decisions are distorted if marginal tax 
rates differ across countries. In case of formula apportionment, an aggregate EU wide 
tax base is divided between countries using a pre-determined formula depending on a 
combination of capital investments, employment and sales. Profit-shifting and 
investment distortions due to cross-country differences in taxation are prohibited. 
However, the multinationals recognize that their investments will modify the formula for 
dividing the EU wide tax base, hence multinationals over-invest in low tax countries: 
shifting paper profits is replaced with a new distortion on investment decisions. Tax 
competition can even be intensified as a result. Furthermore, formula apportionment 
implies cross-country loss off-set which causes a net tax revenue loss for governments 
in the EU because losses can be off-set directly instead of over time.36 
 
3.5. Simulation studies 
The wide range of arguments summarized above provides a confusing picture on the 
aggregate welfare effect of corporate income tax harmonization. Therefore, simulation 
analyses have been conducted with an increasing degree of institutional detail. First, 
when using a model close to the classical tax competition model, the welfare gain of 
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coordinated capital income taxes is estimated in the range of 2-10 % of tax revenue.37 
These estimates are, however, sensitive to the underlying parameters which are hard to 
quantify for these stylized models.38  
In a more refined model including multiple tax distortions39 and a welfare maximizing 
government that intends to redistribute income towards the poor, the welfare gain from 
fully harmonized capital income taxes equals 1.42 % of GDP.40 When lump-sum taxes 
are introduced, such that cooperation only implies more redistribution, the welfare gain 
from cooperation declines until 0.94 % of GDP. In a more realistic setting with regions 
that differ in size and preference for redistribution (calibrated on Northern Europe, 
Continental Europe, UK and the US), the welfare gain from coordination declines even 
further: 0.32-0.10 % of GDP.  
However, the model underlying these results still lacks country specific institutional 
detail. In an attempt to provide a more accurate estimate of the surplus from 
cooperation, various scholars have recently developed models that contain a large 
number of EU and/or OECD member countries and more institutional detail.41 This 
increased realism allows for profit-shifting by transfer pricing and financial policies. 
However, the increased institutional detail comes at a cost: we need to assume that 
government policy is exogenous. It seems impossible to simulate a simultaneous 
strategic game between large numbers of countries. Furthermore, the models exclude all 
redistributive motives and decisions regarding the supply of public goods. The common 
gain from cooperation is therefore solely an improved allocation of resources.  
From these papers, the complete harmonization of both rates and the definition of 
taxable income would generate a welfare gain in the range 0-0.2 % of GDP, exclusive 
the reduction in compliance costs which is not modeled.42 The aggregate efficiency gain 
is small43 due to differences in personal capital and labor taxes across countries, and an 
elastic aggregate EU wide capital stock. Compared to full harmonization, the welfare 
gain of only a tax base harmonization is even smaller: max 0.05% of GDP.44 
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Besides being relatively small, the aggregate welfare gain is asymmetrically distributed 
across countries, where some actually lose. Cooperation re-divides EU wide GDP 
instead of creating substantial new income; this creates winners and losers. The papers 
find that the countries that gain from harmonization in terms of tax revenue, lose in terms 
of welfare. This because GDP is negatively correlated with the average tax burden. 
Countries that are forced to broaden their tax base obtain more tax revenue but lose in 
terms of welfare, as the latter follows GDP. 
This insight carries over to the final class of simulation studies that analyze the welfare 
effects of introducing the CCCTB.45 In general, the welfare effects of introducing the 
CCCTB combined with harmonized rates in the EU are comparable to the previous 
studies: max 0.15 % of GDP. However, when the statutory rate is not harmonized the 
average welfare gain drops: max 0.12 % of GDP. Finally, when the common 
consolidated tax base is not compulsory but optional for large EU multinationals the 
welfare gain almost vanishes: max 0.02 % of GDP. When corporate income or labor 
income taxes, instead of lump-sum taxes, are used to finance the drop in tax revenues 
the welfare gains are even lower. The intuition behind these findings comes from two 
arguments. First, when only the tax base is harmonized, existent differences in statutory 
corporate income taxes and personal income taxes remain. Second, present distortions 
from separate accounting are replaced by new ones due to formula apportionment. The 
choice of formula is important in determining the winners and losers from this reform. In 
accordance with the previous studies, countries that are forced to broaden their tax base 
gain tax revenue but lose welfare and vice versa. 
 
3.6. Summarizing 
Once the assumptions of the classical tax competition models are relaxed, tax 
harmonization is not unambiguously welfare improving for all countries. The applied 
general equilibrium models with the highest degree of institutional detail predict small 
aggregate welfare gains from the current EU proposals. However, the studies ignore a 
number of important arguments: redistributional motives or rent-seeking by the 
government and endogenous optimal policy responses in the remaining tax instruments. 
The latter implies that the models only provide short run predictions. Furthermore, the 
welfare gains are asymmetrically distributed such that not every country gains from 
cooperation. 
When side payments are available this problem might be solved.46 The surplus can be 
shared such that every country is better off compared to the pre-coalition equilibrium. 
However, side payments are not always politically achievable. Would the Germans and 
French be prepared to bail out the Irish or Dutch for reforming their competitive tax 
systems? Therefore, studying the alternative option of an enhanced cooperation 
between a subset of countries is interesting. 
 
 
 
                                                 
45
 See L. Bettendorf, A. van der Horst, and H. Rojas-Romagosa, 2007, Will Corporate Tax Consolidation 
improve Efficiency in the EU? Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no. 07-076/2, M. Devereux and S. 
Loretz, 2008, The Effects of EU Formula Apportionment on Corporate Tax Revenues, Fiscal Studies, 29, 1-
33, and L. Bettendorf, M. Devereux, A. van der Horst and R. A. de Mooij, 2009, Corporate tax harmonization 
in the EU, Economic Policy, forthcoming. 
46
 M. C. Kemp and H. J. Wan, 1976, An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs 
Unions, Journal of International Economics, 6, 95-97. 
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4. Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This section discusses the expected welfare effects of an enhanced cooperation 
agreement (ECA) between a subset of countries. First, I introduce the legal framework 
for introducing ECAs in the EU. Second, I discuss how coalitions are formed and what 
complications arise from a general perspective. Third, I focus on ECAs in stylized capital 
taxation models. Finally, simulation studies on the welfare effects of ECAs are 
discussed. 
  
4.2. Legal framework 
An ECA is defined as cooperation between a subgroup of countries on a particular 
government policy while the remaining countries decide upon this policy autonomously. 
ECAs are institutionalized within the EU by the treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice 
(2003) and modified by the treaty of Lisbon which is effective since 2009. An ECA must 
comply with a number of restrictions which are described in the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).47 First, 
the ECA can only be initiated as a mechanism of last resort (Article 20 TEU). That is, 
only if a coalition of all EU member countries cannot be expected to be formed within a 
reasonable time span. Second, the minimum threshold for the number of participating 
member states is nine (Article 20 TEU).48 Third, the ECA is open for participation to all 
member states at all time against the entry restrictions imposed by the members of the 
ECA (Article 20 TEU, Article 328 TFEU). Fourth, the ECA must be formed such that a 
maximum number of member states are willing to participate (Article 328 TFEU). Fifth, 
the ECA must reinforce the process on integration within the EU and protect its interests 
(Article 20 TEU, Article 326 TFEU). So, the ECA is not allowed to undermine the single 
market, free trade and fair competition, etc. Sixth, all EU member states are allowed to 
participate in the discussions concerning the ECA common policy, but only the 
participating member states take part in the voting (Article 20 TEU, Article 330 TFEU). 
Seventh, the voting procedure is the unanimity rule unless stipulated otherwise by the 
members of the ECA (Article 333 TFEU). Finally, the creation of an ECA requires a 
qualified majority in the council (Article 329 TFEU).49  
 
4.3. ECA formation: some general lessons 
Let me start with some important lessons from the literature on coalition formation. To 
form a coalition, the participating countries must agree on three, interrelated, issues. 
First, they must decide on the common policy to be implemented. This common policy 
defines the gains from cooperation. Second, they must decide on a sharing rule: a 
transfer scheme that stipulates how to divide the gains from cooperation. Third, the 
countries must agree on the coalition partners. Each partner to the coalition will bring its 
own preferences and endowments; this influences the payoff for the other members. It 
follows that in case of asymmetries between countries, a grand coalition between all 
countries need not be the outcome of a coalition formation process. This holds even 
                                                 
47
 Treaty of the European Union, 2010, Consolidated versions of the treaty on European Union and the 
treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C 83. 
48
 The treaties of Amsterdam and Nice stipulated a minimum of eight member states, the treaty of Lisbon 
modified this into 1/3 of the members states of the EU. 
49
 In case the ECA concerns the common foreign and security policy unanimity is required (Article 330 
TFEU). The treaty of Amsterdam stipulated that unanimity was required to approve any ECA. This implied a 
veto for every country such that an ECA was very hard to implement.  
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when side-payments are available.50 It might be impossible to devise a sharing rule that 
assigns to each country a payoff that is at least as high as the payoff from its best 
deviation strategy. When this occurs, the grand coalition is unstable as at least one 
country will be interested in opting out of the coalition. This finding stresses the 
relevance of studying the welfare implications of enhanced cooperation.  
Two general questions arise. First, when will an ECA be welfare improving for both the 
participating countries and the outsider countries? A coalition is welfare improving for all 
countries when spillovers within the coalition are of the same sign as the spillovers 
between the coalition and the outsider countries.51 For this case, the change in policy by 
the coalition members, which internalizes within-coalition spillovers, is to the benefit of 
outsider countries. 
Second, is an ECA a worthwhile policy direction when the gains from cooperation are 
uncertain? This question is answered by Bordignon and Brusco52 who find that an ECA 
might be a useful in-between step when there are large policy asymmetries between 
countries initially, the gains from cooperation are unsure, and adjusting the domestic 
policy to the ECA standard is costly. Countries with comparable initial policies can, by 
forming an ECA, reap the benefits of a level playing field at relative low cost. When in 
the future the gains from coordination turn out to be relative large, outsiders can decide 
to join in: the ECA serves as a pilot group.  
However, caution is required. The creation of a pilot group will establish new vested 
interests. The literature labels this the status quo bias. The choice of common policy by 
the ECA might influence a future global standard and therefore both welfare and the 
entry decision by outsider countries.53 After establishing the ECA, the initial ECA 
members might be reluctant to accept new-comers. The benefits from expanding the 
coalition must be traded off against changes in both the common policy and the sharing 
rule demanded by the new-comer. The ECA therefore has the potential of creating a 
status quo which influences future developments. It remains unsure whether the EU 
rules on ECA formation exclude such a status quo bias. After establishing the ECA, 
outsiders cannot be deterred entry. But the initial members will anticipate this and might 
choose their policy such that a re-negotiation is necessary from the perspective of new-
comers before they are willing to enter.  
 
4.4. Applied to the tax competition literature 
The general arguments above can be supplemented by arguments more specific to the 
tax competition literature. Let me start with ECAs in the classical tax competition 
model.54 Cooperation between a subset of countries is unambiguously welfare improving 
for both insiders and outsiders if the tax rates of the outsider countries and the union are 
strategic complements.55 This conclusion reflects the general lessons above; the 
                                                 
50
 J. B. Burbidge, J. A. DePater, G. M. Myers, and A. Sengupta, 1997, A Coalition-Formation Approach to 
Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs, The American Economic Review, 87, 940-956. Burbidge et al. 
define side payments as an equal share in the common gains from cooperation. Every coalition partner 
receives its initial, before coalition, payoff plus an equal share in the common gain. 
51
 P. Beadry, P. Cahuc and H. Kempf, 2000, Is it Harmful to Allow Partial Cooperation Scandinavian Journal 
of Economics, 102, 1-21. 
52
 M. Bordignon and S. Brusco, 2006, On enhanced cooperation, Journal of Public Economics, 90, 2063-
2090. 
53
 A. Alesina, I. Angeloni and F. Etro, 2005, International Unions, American Economic Review, 95, 602-615.  
54
 K. A. Konrad and G. Schjelderup, 1999, Fortress Building in Global Tax Competition, Journal of Urban 
Economics, 46, 156-167, and S. Bucovetsky, 2009, An index of capital tax competition, International Tax 
and Public Finance, 16, 727-752. 
55
 Strategic complementarity: when confronted with a tax rate increase in a neighboring country the home 
government increases its own rate. In case of strategic substitutes the opposite holds. 
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classical tax competition model is characterized by positive tax spillovers within the 
union and between the union and the outsider countries. The assumption on the 
strategic complementarity by governments is crucial, if this does not hold welfare losses 
appear for either insiders or outsiders.56  
In line with the previous section, a number of qualifications on the expected welfare gain 
from an ECA in corporate income taxation can be identified. First, what about the 
necessary common gain from cooperation? In this respect, especially the elastic 
aggregate tax base for the coalition should be stressed. An increased level of taxation 
within the coalition will lead to an outflow of profits and capital to the remaining 
countries.57 Ceteris paribus, the gain from cooperation will be smaller in case of an ECA 
compared to a full cooperation between all countries.  
Similar arguments hold in case the ECA decides to implement the CCCTB. For instance, 
at least in the short run, inward profit shifting from the rest of the world might increase 
the aggregate tax base after implementation of the CCCTB.58 Total profit shifting 
between the partial union and the outsider country depends on the difference between 
the statutory tax rate of the outsider country and the effective tax rate in the coalition. 
After formula apportionment is introduced, multinationals will re-allocate investment 
towards the low tax coalition countries. This causes the effective tax rate of the coalition 
to be lower than the average pre-harmonization statutory tax rates of the countries that 
form the coalition: the incentive to shift profit out of the coalition decreases. This is all 
under the assumption that countries have not changed their statutory rates after the 
implementation of the CCCTB. However, in the long run the gain might disappear when 
statutory rates are adjusted. Even worse, when multinationals can still use a financing 
detour in an un-active affiliate in a low tax country, profits will be shifted out of the 
coalition if the average tax rate is raised after the coalition is formed.59 Furthermore, 
coalition members might be reluctant to enforce the tax code as the revenues from 
enforcement must be shared among all coalition partners.60 However, to the contrary, 
this reluctance to enforce the tax code might be welfare improving when the desire by 
multinationals to shift more profits leads intermediaries to demand a higher price for their 
services.61 
Second, what does asymmetry imply for the welfare gains of an ECA? In general, the 
conclusions from the full cooperation literature carry over. Winners and losers from 
cooperation might arise as interests are not aligned. The formation of coalitions is 
difficult as every potential coalition member has a unique optimal deviation strategy and 
it might be impossible to find a sharing rule that overbids all these optimal deviation 
payoffs.62  
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 R. A. de Mooij, and H. Vrijburg, 2010, Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition, 
CESIfo Working Paper no. 2915.  
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 N. Riedel and M. Runkel, 2007, Company tax reform with a water’s edge, Journal of Public Economics, 
91, 1533-1554. 
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 M. Gerard, 2007, Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, CESIfo Economic 
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 J. Becker and C. Fuest, 2007, Tax Enforcement and Tax Havens under Formula Apportionment, FiFo-
CPE Discussion Paper No. 08-8, Köln. 
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 J. B. Burbidge, J. A. DePater, G. M. Myers, and A. Sengupta, 1997, A Coalition-Formation Approach to 
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Asymmetries make certain coalitions more likely compared to others. For example, 
countries with similar policies are more likely to form a coalition as the costs of 
cooperation are relatively small.63 As a second example, a coalition between larger 
countries yields larger common gains from cooperation compared to a coalition between 
small countries. Three arguments explain this result. First, the spillovers internalized by 
a coalition of small countries are relatively small compared to the spillovers internalized 
by larger countries. Second, the aggregate tax base of a coalition between small 
countries is found to be relatively elastic compared to the aggregate tax base of a 
coalition between larger countries. Third, in the model considered, the outsider in case of 
a coalition of small countries is more likely to reduce its tax rate in response to an 
increase in the tax rate by the coalition members (strategic substitutes) compared to the 
outsider in case of a coalition of large countries.64  
This final argument highlights the relevance of the optimal tax responses, which leads us 
to the issue of government behavior. How do governments change their optimal tax 
policies? This question becomes crucial when studying enhanced cooperation. The 
policy change by the outsiders determines the common gain for the insiders and vice 
versa.  
In the standard tax competition model, the government maximizes welfare and easily 
commits to future policies. Due to symmetry between countries, tax rates are in general 
strategic complements. When symmetry is not imposed, tax rates need not be strategic 
complements though. A tax policy change in a neighboring country provides two 
opposing incentives to the home government. First, tax revenues are increased due to 
an inward flow of profits or capital.65 This gives a welfare maximizing government the 
incentive to lower its tax rate to redistribute part of this increased tax revenue towards 
private consumption. Second, the broader tax base and the capital imported reduce the 
marginal cost of funds; it becomes cheaper to raise additional tax revenue. This latter 
argument gives an incentive to raise the tax rate. The former argument is more likely to 
dominate when the demand for public goods is inelastic and original tax policy is far from 
the top of the Laffer curve for the respective country. The second condition indicates that 
public goods where not heavily undersupplied in the country initially.66  
Empirical evidence supports the assumption of strategic complementarity,67 but only 
provides evidence on the average strategic reaction by the average country on the short 
run. Data limitations prevent sophisticated estimation of strategic responses between 
different types of countries in case of major policy reforms such as the implementation of 
an ECA with CCCTB within the EU. It can therefore not be excluded that particular 
countries will act as a strategic substitute on the long run when confronted with such a 
major policy shock. The welfare gain for the cooperating countries will be lower than 
expected as a result. 
Furthermore, the literature is silent on the welfare effects of enhanced cooperation when 
governments are of the Leviathan type. The creation of an ECA by leviathan 
governments might be rewarding for both insiders and outsiders if leviathan 
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 Alesina A., Angeloni I. and F. Etro, 2005, “International Unions,” American Economic Review, 95, 602-615 
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governments are more likely to act complementary in a strategic game compared to 
benevolent governments. 
On the positive side, an ECA can be an attractive policy direction when the government 
has commitment problems. In this case, the government is unable to impose the welfare 
maximizing policy under full cooperation as consumers make an inefficient savings 
decision when expecting the government to raise taxes in the future. Full competition on 
the other hand might result in tax rates that are to low from a global welfare perspective. 
The ECA is a comfortable in-between choice.68  
Finally, as mentioned before, the literature does not cover an analysis including 
sophisticated expectations by the insiders regarding the strategic actions of outsiders 
now and in the future. De Mooij and Vrijburg consider the case where the ECA acts as a 
Stackelberg leader with respect to the strategic tax setting of outsiders. These 
expectations enhance welfare in case of strategic complementarity. However, in case of 
strategic substitutes, outsiders might lose due to the creation of the ECA.69 
  
4.5. Simulation studies with computable general equilibrium models 
Various simulation studies confirm the reservations with respect to the welfare effects of 
an ECA listed above. In a model with symmetric countries, an ECA between some of 
these countries yields a welfare gain of 0.10 % of GDP compared to the 0.94% of GDP 
mentioned above for full harmonization.70 Furthermore, when the model is calibrated on 
a more realistic setting with an ECA between EU member countries and the US as an 
outsider, the welfare gains are between 0.16-0.19 % of GDP depending on the strategic 
change in tax policy by the US. Four additional results are noteworthy. First, the outsider 
country, the US, gains from EU cooperation (0.20 % of GDP). Second, the US responds 
by increasing its capital taxes when confronted with an increase in capital taxation in the 
EU: strategic complementarity. Third, within the coalition especially the countries with a 
strong preference for redistribution experience a large welfare gain. However, no country 
loses from cooperating in this setting. Fourth, when the aggregate capital stock is more 
elastic, the gains from forming an ECA deteriorate. 
In a model with more institutional detail, the aggregate welfare gain from ECA is even 
smaller: 0.05 % of GDP compared to 0.2 % of GDP under full harmonization.71 Again 
winners and losers occur due the absence of a large common gain from cooperation. 
Instead, the ECA exports some of the efficiency gain abroad and re-divides pre-
cooperation GDP.  
Finally, the welfare effects of an ECA within the EU that imposes a CCCTB are close to 
zero on average for both insiders and outsiders.72 There is hardly a net common gain 
from cooperation. This holds for a number of different coalitions. Cooperation therefore 
results in a redistribution of economic activity, creating winners and losers. When the 
losers decide to opt out the ECA, there is nothing left for the winners. It must be stressed 
though, that the above studies only measure the efficiency gain from an improved 
allocation of resources, the expected reduction in compliance costs is excluded.  
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4.6. Summary 
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that, compared to the cooperation across 
all countries, enhanced cooperation leads to marginal welfare gains. The main argument 
for this result is that the efficiency gains from a partial harmonization of tax rates (either 
a subset of rates, a subset of countries, or a combination) are small. Besides this, the 
welfare gains suggested by the simulation studies are uncertain as a number of 
important arguments (for example: compliance costs and redistribution) are excluded 
from the simulation analyses. Furthermore, strategic behavior by governments might 
introduce a status quo bias for future policy coordination and welfare losses for countries 
outside the coalition.  
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
From the 1960s onward the EU has been trying to harmonize part of the corporate 
income tax legislation. Over time the number of opposing views has increased with the 
entrance of new member states and proposals have become less ambitious. In general, 
harmonization initiatives are unsuccessful until today. In order to circumvent the 
opposing views on the optimal corporate tax system, the option of enhanced cooperation 
between a subset of countries, instead of all 27 member states, is suggested as a 
potential way out. This paper provides a review of the tax harmonization literature with a 
special focus on enhanced cooperation in corporate taxation.  
Based on this review of the literature, I conclude that the expected welfare gains from an 
enhanced cooperation agreement with CCCTB between a subset of countries are 
expected to be small and uncertain. Furthermore, some questionable side effects might 
appear that have not been analyzed thoroughly yet. The arguments can be summarized 
as follows. 
First, full harmonization of corporate taxes in general, and the EU wide introduction of 
the CCCTB in particular, come with small efficiency gains that are asymmetrically 
distributed across countries.73 Countries that are forced to broaden their tax base will 
obtain additional tax revenue but experience a reduction in GDP. The latter implies that 
welfare is reduced. The opposite holds for countries that are forced to shrink their tax 
base. These asymmetric expected welfare gains that are relatively small on average, 
combined with the large number of countries negotiating and the difficulty to design 
perfect side-payments, leads to the expectation that it will be hard to reach an 
agreement in the near future. Even stronger, it might be impossible to design a rule for 
sharing the gains from cooperation such that every country prefers cooperation above 
the current situation. 
Second, for smaller coalitions the welfare gains are expected to be even smaller. Part of 
the common gain from cooperation is “exported” to the outsiders. Most strikingly, the 
simulations suggest hardly a common (efficiency) gain from cooperation. Cooperation 
without a common gain seems a useless exercise.  
However, the welfare analyses leave out two potential sources for a common gain from 
cooperation. On the one hand, a common gain might be achieved via a more efficient 
supply of public goods, including redistribution. However, preferences for public goods 
are likely to come with asymmetries in the preference for public goods. The latter calls 
for diversified tax policy which reduces the gains from cooperation. On the other hand, 
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compliance costs are expected to be reduced, a consensus estimate on the size of 
these gains is missing from the empirical literature. 
Furthermore, three arguments call for caution when pursuing enhanced cooperation in 
corporate income taxes. First, the simulation analyses exclude strategic behavior on 
account of the insiders. A subgroup of countries might try to sub-track some surplus from 
the remaining countries by choosing their common policy strategically. In doing so, a 
status-quo bias emerges that frustrates future cooperation initiatives. Especially in case 
the average efficiency gains from cooperation are small one should be suspicious if an 
agreement between a subgroup of countries comes through. Second, the potential for 
strategic substitutes between the tax rates of the insiders and outsiders might well be 
under estimated. The existence of strategic substitutes erodes part of the common gains 
from cooperation. Third, while the above argument suggests a well-functioning 
government that is capable of implementing the necessary policy, this need not at all be 
the case: “… there is no hope that a coordinated process of harmonization between 
people who do not aim at good tax structures at the national level could bring about a 
good harmonized tax structure.”74 
The above conclusions follow from the analyses by economists, in the end, politicians 
must decide on the complete story. I advice politicians to focus on the domestic 
inefficiencies and inconsistencies in corporate income tax policies first.75 European 
action might help to ensure that all 27 countries agree on the desired future direction of 
corporate income taxation.76 Maybe this approach leads to a future corporate tax system 
that is less differs and therefore more easy to harmonize. Only then can full cross-
country harmonization be considered. 
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